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Abstract
Independent fiscal institutions (IFIs) have been established or reformed in all eurozone countries following the reform of
economic governance. As they are expected to counter the deficit bias of the governments and the information asymmetry
of the legislatures and the public over the management of the budget, IFIs may support or even strengthen parliamentary
accountability. This hypothesis is tested with regard to three IFIs, the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council, the Italian Parliamentary
Budget Office, and the Spanish Independent Authority for Fiscal Responsibility. Although the economic context in which
the IFIs were created was similar in the three eurozone countries, as was their mandate, these institutions have a rather
different institutional positioning, being within the Parliament, in Italy; within the Executive, in Spain; and a stand‐alone
body in Ireland. This is likely to influence the IFIs’ contribution to parliamentary accountability andwe hypothesize that the
closer the position of an IFI and its contacts to the parliament, the stronger is the scrutiny of the executive on budgetary
policies. The analysis of parliamentary questions, hearings, and of the activation of the ‘comply or explain’ procedures
shows that, overall, the IFIs’ potential role to enhance parliamentary accountability has remained underexploited by the
three legislatures, with no significant differences as for the institutional positioning of the IFI.
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1. Introduction
Ten years after the reform of European economic gov‐
ernance, its medium‐term implications on democratic
accountability are still to be explored to a large extent.
Scholars have analysed at length the effects of the
new European fiscal and economic rules on parlia‐
ments and have shown diverging views in this respect
(Woźniakowski et al., 2021). At the same time, investi‐
gation into the new independent fiscal institutions (IFIs),
the non‐majoritarian technocratic bodies established or
reformed under EU law after the eurozone crisis, and
their impact on parliamentary activity within the eco‐
nomic governance procedures, is still very limited and at
an early stage (see Fasone & Griglio, 2013, pp. 264–265;
Horvath, 2018, p. 504).
As a consequence of the reinforced ‘two‐level game’
that characterizes the policy‐making in the post‐crisis
governance (Crum, 2018, pp. 273–274), between the
national and the supranational levels of government,
the problem of information asymmetry already faced
by domestic parliaments is further worsened by the
difficulty to place clear responsibilities for the deci‐
sions taken, even though the executives still remain
the main interlocutors for legislatures. Taking stock of
these problems and aiming to restore fiscal sustainability,
EU legislative acts—and provisions of the Fiscal Compact
(Article 3.2)—were introduced to make the setting up of
national IFIs mandatory by the end of 2013 (EU Directive
2011/85). Great discretion is left to Member States as
for the design, organisation, and powers of IFIs. Article 2
of EU Regulation 473/2013—applicable to eurozone
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 3, Pages 135–144 135
countries only—lists the basic features IFIs should have,
including a statutory regime provided by law, indepen‐
dence from the budgetary authorities and public and pri‐
vate bodies, appointment of their members based on
competence and expertise, access to information and
adequate resources to fulfil their role, and a capacity to
communicate publicly and in a timely manner.
Under Article 5 of this Regulation, IFIs shall ensure
the compliance of the national budgetary processes
with numerical fiscal rules incorporating Member States’
medium‐term objectives (MTO) and, in general, with the
deficit and debt rules set out in the EU Treaties and leg‐
islation. ‘Where appropriate,’ they also provide public
assessments with respect to national fiscal rules, and
they evaluate whether there are conditions to activate
the correction mechanism; if it is employed they also
determine if the correction is proceeding in accordance
with national rules and plans, as well as if any of the cir‐
cumstances allowing the temporary deviation from the
MTO have arisen or ceased. While nothing is added in
EU law as for their relationship with parliaments, the lat‐
ter could benefit from the information produced and the
assessment published by IFIs in the budgetary domain.
This article focuses on the effects of the setting up
and functioning of IFIs on parliamentary accountabil‐
ity, post‐crisis. It seeks to answer the following research
question: Has the creation of IFIs in the eurozone, in the
framework of the post‐crisis economic governance, indi‐
rectly contributed to enhancing parliamentary account‐
ability at the national level? Indeed, it is hypothesized
here that: 1) the reports, the opinions and the assess‐
ments published by IFIs, particularly if directly transmit‐
ted to the parliaments, can support their ability to hold
the governments accountable; and that 2) the closer
is an IFI to the parliament, the more the parliamen‐
tary scrutiny on the executive is likely to be strength‐
ened. The article first investigates the complex relation‐
ship between parliamentary accountability and IFIs in
the new economic governance. It then offers a com‐
parative analysis of the contribution of the Irish Fiscal
Advisory Council (IFAC), the Italian Parliamentary Budget
Office (IPBO), and the Spanish Independent Authority for
Fiscal Responsibility (AIReF) in relation to parliamentary
accountability in the three domestic contexts. The article
highlights that legislatures in the selected countries have
exploited IFIs’ activity only to a limited extent to enhance
the scrutiny procedures of the executive and that such
an outcome does not appear to be strongly influenced
by the institutional positioning of the IFI.
2. Parliamentary Accountability and Independent
Fiscal Institutions in the Post‐Crisis Economic
Governance
Elaborating on Bovens’ definition (2007, p. 447), in parlia‐
mentary systems parliamentary accountability refers to
the relationship between an executive and a parliament,
in which the executive has an obligation to explain and
justify its conduct; the parliament has the ability to pose
questions and pass judgments; and the executive may
face consequences, typically of a political nature, includ‐
ing forced resignation. As such, accountability is man‐
aged by parliaments by seeking to obtain information
and explanations from the executive on its policies as
well as by asking the government to adjust and correct its
action, if needed, even by threatening to use or impose
sanctions (Auel, 2007, p. 500;Woźniakowski et al., 2021).
The simple existence of IFIs may lead to an enhance‐
ment of parliamentary accountability given the two
objectives they aim to pursue: to counter the deficit
bias of the government and to re‐balance the informa‐
tion asymmetry on budgetary issues (Beetsma&Debrun,
2016, pp. 4–9; Hagemann, 2011, p. 77; Tesche, 2019,
pp. 1211–1212). Acting with a short‐term perspective,
one of electoral cycles to seek re‐election, governments
are typically keen to increase expenditure and reduce
taxes to please the electors with immediate benefits,
thereby expanding the deficit (Viney & Poole, 2019,
pp. 444–447). Although this may not be the case in the
so‐called ‘frugal’ countries which are used to following
tight fiscal discipline as the main direction of political
economy, with little variation in relation to the govern‐
ment in office. The parliament and its majority can be
more or less cooperative with the government to sec‐
ond the strategy of deficit spending. By providing an
autonomous and authoritative public assessment of the
executive’s fiscal and budgetary policies, of their sustain‐
ability and long‐term impact, in principle, the IFIs make it
possible for the parliament and especially for the opposi‐
tion to use their reports, briefings, andopinions as bench‐
marks with which the government’s information can be
checked; if need be, the reliability and desirability of the
latter for the national political economy can be contested
based on a technical, non‐partisan, and expert account.
The government may thus be prompted to take a differ‐
ent course of action and to revise its estimates, accord‐
ing to the IFI’s position and following MPs’ directions.
The detection by an IFI of a violation of the deficit and
debt rules may trigger a ‘comply or explain’ procedure,
whereby the government is compelled to appear in front
of the parliament to justify its choice, to adjust its posi‐
tion, or to explain why it does not intend to follow the
IFI’s advice (Fromage, 2017, p. 137–138).
Also, the second function fulfilled by IFIs, to tame
the executive dominance over financial and economic
information (Tesche, 2019, p. 1217; Viney & Poole, 2019,
p. 447), can be instrumental to improving parliamen‐
tary scrutiny and accountability. As well known, Dicey’s
view on the centrality of the parliamentary scrutiny of
the budget (Dicey, 1885/2013, pp. 171–175) has in real‐
ity long been outdated (Bateman, 2020, pp. 3–15; Ruiz
Almendral, 2017, pp. 27–28). The quasi‐monopoly of the
information on the budget in the hands of the national
Treasuries have traditionallymade it difficult for the legis‐
latures to gain accurate control of the government’s esti‐
mates and to ground their assessment on independent
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information, especially for parliaments devoid of a strong
administrative apparatus. The situation is further wors‐
ened in the EU context and in the eurozone in par‐
ticular, given that there are ‘too many executives’ to
control in principle (Curtin, 2014, p. 4) and that the
diluted responsibilities in economic governance decision‐
making do not help to foster streamlined and effective
procedures of parliamentary control and scrutiny (Crum,
2018, p. 280). In contrast to this trend, the rise of IFIs
at the domestic level, with the solid expertise of their
members on economic and fiscal matters, could be used
as independent and non‐partisan benchmark for parlia‐
mentary debates, providing an autonomous assessment
not just on the national fiscal andmacroeconomic figures
offered by the government, but also on the European fis‐
cal stance.
Although the EU has followed a minimalist approach
on the institutional configuration of IFIs, even in euro‐
zone countries, the way EU law has been interpreted by
the European Commission (hereafter, the Commission)
hints at the fact that IFIs are conceived as enablers of
parliamentary accountability as well as being indepen‐
dent watchdogs meant to contribute to fiscal sustain‐
ability. The Commission has repeatedly warnedMember
States against the threat of IFIs lacking independence
and autonomy from the budgetary authorities. Overly
close ties of an IFI with the executive have been criti‐
cised by the Commission not only in relation to author‐
ities that were evidently ‘agents’ of the Government,
such as the Polish Supreme Audit Office after 2015, but
also concerning IFIs set up within the executive, even
if they enjoyed a certain autonomy, such as in Belgium
(European Commission, 2017, pp. 9–10). By the same
token, the Commission has regularly recommended that
Member States provide for ‘comply or explain’ proce‐
dures in parliament whenever the estimates, forecasts,
and figures produced by the government do not reflect
those of the IFI or are considered unrealistic by it
(European Commission, 2012, point 7).
In the EU, most IFIs were established within the
executive, though being functionally independent, or as
stand‐alone bodies. Their members are usually nomi‐
nated by the government or the government is in charge
of the final appointment (Closa et al., 2020, pp. 24–26).
As long as they are equipped with independent staff
and resources, sufficient to fulfil their tasks, with an
autonomous mandate protected by law (regardless of
whether it is enshrined in a statutory provision or in a
governmental regulation), and they are granted access
to information, the relationship of the IFIs with the exec‐
utive is not problematic from the viewpoint of the inde‐
pendence from the budgetary authorities, according to
the Commission. Yet, on the one hand, the relation‐
ship with the parliament is considered by Horvath (2018,
pp. 511–513) as one of the seven indicators composing
the IFIs’ “aggregate scrutiny effectiveness index,” next to
the breadth of the mandate, financial resources, human
resources, access to information, public awareness, and
reaction from government. This hints at the importance
of contacts and exchanges between the IFIs and parlia‐
mentary bodies and MPs as the democratic place par
excellence where fiscal choices are made. On the other
hand, we may expect that the institutional positioning
of an IFI can impact accountability procedures in par‐
liament. Without this jeopardising their independence,
IFIs that are hostedwithin parliamentary institutions, i.e.,
parliamentary budget offices, may be in a better position
to enable the legislatures to fulfil enhanced scrutiny of
the government than those set up within the executive,
as stand‐alone institutions, or are attached to the court
of auditors and to a central bank. Of course, the IFIs’ insti‐
tutional ‘embedding’ in terms of proximity to the par‐
liament can vary depending on the appointment proce‐
dures, the frequency of the contact, especially if man‐
dated by law, and on the consequences of the IFI’s activ‐
ity on the government (e.g., how the ‘comply or explain’
procedure is activated and with which consequences for
the legislature).
From this elaboration on parliamentary accountabil‐
ity and on the rationales for the setting up of IFIs, two
guiding hypotheses can be derived. First, the technical
and non‐partisan information provided by the IFIs can
enable the legislatures to pose better‐informed ques‐
tions and to pass more accurate judgments on the bud‐
getary decisions taken by the government, thereby forc‐
ing the executive to publicly explain (as well as to par‐
liament) any deviation from the IFI’s assessment, and if
need be, to correct its action. Second, regarding the IFIs’
positioning, it can be expected that when such an insti‐
tution takes the form of a parliamentary budget office,
the collaboration between the IFI and the legislature can
allow the Parliament to make the most of the informa‐
tion flow deriving from the IFI to control the government
and to use the ‘comply or explain’ procedure as a fur‐
ther accountability tool compared to the case of a stand‐
alone fiscal council or an IFI established within the exec‐
utive, with its looser relationship with the legislature.
3. Research Design
3.1. Analytical Framework
To assess if and to what extent parliamentary account‐
ability has been (positively) affected by the work of IFIs
(first hypothesis) threemain variables are to be assessed.
First of all, the frequency and the issues covered by the
hearings of IFIs’ members in parliament are investigated,
treating hearings as a tool to get information on the fis‐
cal soundness of the executive policies and for the legisla‐
ture to develop an independent evaluation of the govern‐
ment’s performance. Indeed, these hearings can provide
parliament with an invaluable and independent source
of information to control and, if need be, challenge the
government. This assessment is carried out comparing
what the legislative provisions foresee with their imple‐
mentation in practice as it can be that the legislatures
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 3, Pages 135–144 137
effectively use hearings of IFI’s members to collect infor‐
mation or, instead, this tool is seldom activated.
Second, the absolute number of parliamentary ques‐
tions and the number of questions citing or quoting IFIs’
evidence are initially compared as a rough indicator of
whether opinions, reports, and statements of fiscal coun‐
cils are managed by MPs as (new) benchmarks to scruti‐
nize the government, thereby prompting the executive
to provide clarifications and explanations. Relatedly, to
offer a more fine‐grained analysis, an account of the
number and topics covered by parliamentary questions
citing the IFIs’ assessment and the respective replies pro‐
vided by the government to them is offered. This way
it can be detected whether the IFI’s activity is able to
indirectly enrich the parliamentary debate on fiscal poli‐
cies and target the potential deficiencies and pitfalls of
the governmental choices, forcing the executive to take
responsibility for them and better justify its decisions.
Third, the ‘impact’ of IFIs’ assessment on parliamen‐
tary accountability is testedwith regard to the design and
practice of the ‘comply or explain’ procedure, whereby
the government can be called to explain publicly why it
intends to deviate from the IFI’s recommendations and
evaluation or if it is willing to conform. The procedure
is established post‐crisis in most eurozone countries and
special consideration will be given to the direct involve‐
ment of the parliament in such a procedure (which may
either trigger it or act as the forum in front of which the
government has to explain its firm commitment to devi‐
ate from the IFI’s position) and to the actual use of it,
notably, whether the deviation goes unnoticed by the
legislature and if the government prefers to comply or
confirm its standpoint giving due justifications for that.
The influence of IFIs on parliamentary accountabil‐
ity can also vary depending on the type of legislature
we look at. Parliamentary scholars have elaborated a
number of typologies, for example, considering themain
focus of their activity, debating or policy‐making (Polsby,
1975); combining their institutional powers with the
level of public support (Mezey, 1979, p. 23); or zoom‐
ing into the category of the ‘reactive’ legislatures to
rank their ‘policy‐influencing’ capacity, based on their
level of institutionalization, linked to the development of
their internal organization and structure (Norton, 1990,
pp. 143–152). Considering the budgetary powers of par‐
liament specifically, it seems worth looking at Wehner’s
ranking of national legislatures for what concerns their
ability to shape the budget (Wehner, 2010, pp. 45–48):
Crucial factors in this respect are deemed to be for‐
mal and substantive amendment powers of the parlia‐
ment; the consequences stemming from the parliamen‐
tary refusal to approve the budget by the end of the fiscal
year; executive flexibility during the implementation of
the budget; time for scrutiny; committee capacity; and
access to budgetary information, which is linked to the
prospective role of IFIs. Parliaments are then ranked in
between the extreme of Westminster‐style legislatures
with very little influence on the budget to the opposite
end of the most influential budgetary authority, the US
Congress (Wehner, 2010, pp. 60–63). Although in the
EU and in the eurozone, in particular, the adoption of
supranational fiscal rules and the operation of a com‐
mon budgetary timeline has probably made national
parliaments more comparable as budgetary authorities
than they used to be—they act within similar overar‐
ching constraints—differences can still be detected in
their ability to control the formation and the execution
of the budget (Fasone, 2014, pp. 6–10; Markakis, 2020,
pp. 130–141).
The strength of the budgetary powers of a legisla‐
ture may be affected by the choice of the specific posi‐
tioning of an IFI within or outside the parliament (sec‐
ond hypothesis). Indeed, if, according to Wehner (2010,
pp. 50–51), access to budgetary information is one of the
key variables determining the strength of a parliament
as a budgetary authority, then the easier it is for a legis‐
lature to retrieve such information, the better. Without
disregarding the requirement that IFIs be functionally
autonomous, the frequency of contact and the regular
collaboration between a legislature and a parliamentary
budget office, in principle, makes this latter model of
fiscal council be the one that is best suited to enhance
information flow in favour of the Parliament, compared
to a stand‐alone fiscal council or to an IFI placed within
the executive.
3.2. Case Selection
The contribution of IFIs to parliamentary accountabil‐
ity is assessed in three eurozone countries, Ireland,
Italy, and Spain, countries which are (traditionally)
associated with limited levels of compliance with EU
deficit and debt rules and which were beset by seri‐
ous financial troubles during the euro crisis. The choice
is explained by the fact that only eurozone Member
States are bound to apply stricter budgetary rules and
to comply with EU Regulation 473/2013 (by contrast,
non‐euro area countries have to establish IFIs, but are
not expected to abide by the requirements in terms of
institutional design and mandate as per the ‘Two‐Pack’
Regulation). Moreover, Ireland, Italy, and Spain were
amongst the most affected countries during the debt cri‐
sis and they received either financial assistance (Ireland
and Spain) or support (Italy). Thus, not only were
they probably interested in re‐gaining fiscal sustainabil‐
ity and financial credibility—which IFIs are expected
to support (Bertelsmann, 2013, pp. 75–76)—but also
their parliaments had been significantly marginalised
in the adoption of euro‐crisis measures (Moschella,
2017, pp. 253–257). Therefore, the same legislatures
could have seen the newly established IFIs, set up
between 2012–2014, as allies to strengthen parliamen‐
tary accountability.
According to the SIFI index developed by the
Commission to measure the independence and scope
of action of IFIs in the EU, the IFAC, the IPBO, and the
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AIReF are amongst the most independent fiscal institu‐
tions from the budgetary authorities in the euro area
(Closa et al., 2020, pp. 33–34; European Commission,
2021). In addition to this, based on the roles that can
be assigned to them, the Irish, the Italian, and the
Spanish IFIs are also amongst the EU IFIs equipped with
the broadest mandate (Closa et al., 2020, pp. 37–38;
Jankovics & Sherwood, 2017, p. 15).
The three IFIs, however, are rather different regard‐
ing their institutional ‘embedding.’ The IPBO is a collegial
body placed within the parliament and has strong ties
to the legislature, both in the appointment process and
in its functioning (Law no. 243/2012, Article 16, para 2).
The AIReF is a monocratic body placed at the Ministry of
Budget and Public Administration though enjoying organ‐
isational and functional autonomy from the executive
(LeyOrganica 6/2013, Articles 1 and 7). Finally, the IFAC is
a stand‐alone collegial IFI (Irish Parliament, 2012, Part 3),
a ‘child of the crisis,’ which Ireland was demanded to
establish in thememorandumof understanding so that it
could benefit from the rescue programme in 2011 (Closa
et al., 2020, p. 17).
The budgetary powers of the three legislatures,
not by chance, are rather different. While the Irish
Parliament resemblances the Westminster model of a
legislature with a very marginal influence on the bud‐
get (Maatsch, 2017, p. 697), the Italian Parliament has
traditionally shown a remarkable ‘transformative capac‐
ity’ over the budget, also thanks to its strong commit‐
tee system, though remaining rather weak in the ex‐post‐
control over the budget (Griglio, 2020, pp. 209–210).
The Spanish Parliament stands somewhat in between
the two, getting closer to the Italian legislature regard‐
ing committee capacity and ability to shape the content
of the budget, but leaning toward the Irish Parliament
regarding its limited access to budgetary information
(Wehner, 2010, pp. 60–63), at least prior to the setting
up of the AIReF.
The differences in these IFIs’ relationship with the
parliament are patent already in the appointment pro‐
cess. The three members of the IPBO are appointed
by agreement between the Presidents of the Senate
and of the Chamber of Deputies and are chosen from
a list of 10 candidates prepared by the standing com‐
mittees competent on public finance, each one decid‐
ing by two‐thirds majority. In contrast, the involve‐
ment of the Spanish Parliament in the appointment of
the AIReF’s President is more limited. The President is
appointed by the Council of Ministers, upon proposal by
the Minister of the Budget and of Public Administration.
The Committee on the Budget of the Spanish Congress
then invites the appointee for hearings and votes, on
behalf of the Congress and by absolute majority, for its
appointment. Thus, although this has never happened
so far, the Congress could reject the appointee. Unlike
the other two cases, there is no involvement of the
Parliament in the appointment of the five IFAC’s mem‐
bers by theMinister of Finance, but they can be removed
from office for misconduct by the lower house, the
Dáil Éireann.
The significant differences in the institutional posi‐
tioning of the three IFIs, which otherwise show similar
features concerning their level of independence and the
breadth of mandate, allows one to assess whether such
a diverse institutional configuration affects the IFIs’ con‐
tribution to enhancing parliamentary accountability.
The timespan covered by the analysis refers to the
last two years (2019–2020), so as to include the par‐
liamentary activities before and after the Covid‐19 out‐
break; to consider the change in the membership of the
IFAC (both in 2019 and 2020) and the AIReF (in 2020);
change in the composition of the governments in Ireland
(from aminority government led by Fine Gael to a major‐
ity coalition government between Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael,
and the Greens since 2020); in Italy (with the shift since
September 2019 from a coalition government between
the 5SM and Lega to a coalition between the 5SM, the
Democratic Party, and other minor centre‐left political
allies); and in Spain,which experienced twonational elec‐
tions in 2019 (with the PSOE leading a minority gov‐
ernment in crisis first and then a coalition government
with Podemos). Given the confidence relationship in
place, the investigation is limited to lower houses, the
Dáil Éireann, the Italian Chamber of Deputies, and the
Spanish Congress.
The research was carried out through a textual anal‐
ysis of primary sources, i.e., reports, opinions, and rec‐
ommendations issued by the IFIs, transcripts of parlia‐
mentary hearings and of debates, both in committee
and in plenary, the texts of parliamentary questions,
and the governmental responses, retrieved on the web‐
sites and the databases on the parliaments selected.
Moreover, the investigation is complemented by the find‐
ings extracted from secondary sources, ranging from the
relevant literature to the databases and reports on the
IFIs curated by the Commission and the OECD.
4. Parliamentary Accountability at Work via
Independent Fiscal Institutions
4.1. Parliamentary Hearings
The legislation in the three countries makes it com‐
pulsory for the IFIs to appear in front of the parlia‐
ment, under certain conditions. Article 11, para 2, of the
Schedule annexed to the Irish Fiscal Responsibility Act
2012 requires the IFAC chairperson to be heard in front
of the committees about the activity of the IFI when‐
ever requested to do so by these parliamentary bodies.
Article 24, para 8, of the Ley Orgánica 6/2013 states that
the AIReF’s President shall appear in front of the com‐
petent parliamentary committees at least once a year.
More detailed is Article 18 of Italian law no. 243/2012
according to which the President of the IPBO is to be
heard by the parliamentary committees dealing with
public finance at their request and to present them with
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the annual programme of the IFI’s activities. Moreover,
the IPBO drafts opinions and reports for the parliamen‐
tary committees on their demand.
In practice, the appearance of the IFAC’s members in
front of the Dáil Éireann’s committees has not been very
frequent and this has triggered a debate on whether it
might have been appropriate tomove the IFIs closer to or
even inside the Parliament (Downes &Nicol, 2016, p. 69).
In the end, the IFAC’s position has not been changed,
but in 2018 the Irish legislature—in particular its select
committee on budgetary oversight—was equipped with
a parliamentary budget office, which being part of the
Oireachtas’ administration, is not considered an IFI under
EU law by the Commission (though appearing in the
IFIs’ OECD database). Hearings of the IFAC’s members
and staff are organised by the select committee on bud‐
getary oversight on average three times per year, for the
pre‐budget report; during the budget process; and at the
year’s end, in preparation of the new fiscal year. This is
what also happened in 2019, while in 2020 IFAC’s rep‐
resentatives were heard just once, on 16 June 2020, by
the special committee on the response to the Covid‐19
pandemic to evaluate the aptness of the governmental
recovery policies to react to the pandemic. From the ver‐
batim reports of the hearings, a very cautious approach
of the IFAC’s members in answering the questions posed
by MPs can be detected. Recalling that the IFAC’s man‐
date allows it to comment only on the overall fiscal
stance and not to express its view on specific tax mea‐
sures, spending items, or priorities, the Irish IFI tried to
show self‐restraint whenever the debate in the commit‐
tee aimed somewhat to ‘politicise’ the IFAC’s position
expressed in reports and opinions.
The frequency of the hearings is certainly not higher
in Spain. Also due to the elections held in 2019, the then
President of the AIReF, José Luis Escrivá, was only heard
on 29 January, to present the IFI’s report on the bud‐
get law for 2019, compared to the 2–3 parliamentary
hearings that had been organized every year until then.
In 2020, the new AIReF’s President, Cristina Herrero,
who took office in March, was heard three times: on
4 June 2020, in front of the Budget Committee on the
use of the escape clause and the deviation from the
MTO by the Government (which require the approval
by the two Houses of the Cortes by absolute majority
and the endorsement by AIReF) which she supported;
on 16 June, by the Committee for the social and eco‐
nomic recovery, on the governmental strategy to counter
the Covid‐19 crisis; and on 5 November, in front of the
Committee on revenues for an assessment of the bud‐
get bill for 2021. Despite the modest number of hear‐
ings that had taken place, in 2020 only there were 12
requests by MPs (compared to 23 issued over the period
2016–2019) to organise such hearings, plus a request
by the Committee for the social and economic recov‐
ery to AIReF to draft a report on the post‐pandemic eco‐
nomic situation and potential ways out: A sign that in
the Spanish Parliament the information provided by the
AIReF is perceived as an important tool with which to
scrutinize the executive.
Compared to the IFAC and the AIReF, the appearance
of the IPBO’s President in the Chamber of Deputies is
much more frequent and systematic. He was heard in
front of the Budget Committee of the Chamber (although
this is usually a joint hearing by the Budget Committees
of the two Houses) 9 times in 2019 and 11 times in 2020.
Besides the occasion of the presentation of the IFI’s
annual work programme, the hearings were the opportu‐
nity for an in‐depth analysis by MPs of the strengths and
weaknesses of the Document of Economics and Finance
(which also includes the Stability Programme and the
National Reform Programme), of its revision during the
year, and of the repeated requests and related govern‐
mental reports seeking the parliamentary authorisation
to deviate from the MTO (as in Spain, the approval is to
be voted by an absolute majority in each House).
4.2. Parliamentary Questions
From time to time the reports, projections, and recom‐
mendations of the three IFIs are cited or quoted in parlia‐
mentary questions to the government (oral and written,
in committee, and in plenary), to seek explanations and
justification for its action.
Looking just at the numbers may appear mislead‐
ing. It is much more interesting to consider how the
citation of the IFIs’ reports and recommendations has
affected the ‘dialogue’ between MPs and the govern‐
ment through the questions. In Spain, followingwhatwas
said on the hearings, it is confirmed that the questions
citing the IFIs’ evidence to obtain clarifications from the
Government came exclusively from oppositionmembers.
For example, in the written question No. 184/19573 of
24 July 2020, MPs from the group VOX asked whether
the Executive intended to take any action as a follow‐
up to the AIReF’s spending review report on the govern‐
mental program. In response, the Government engaged
with the explanation of the methodology used in that
report, considered that the AIReF had not properly appre‐
ciated the outcomes of the 2013 reform to the said
program, and it also provided clear indications on how
it had tried to implement the critical observations of
the IFI. A series of questions (184/19444, 184/19465,
184/19468, 184/19473 of 23 July 2020) with similar
contents were addressed by MPs from Partido Popular,
Ciudadanos, and VOX on themeasures the Executive was
willing to adopt following the AIReF’s recommendations
on the execution of the budget in 2020. The Government
thus explained its plans for themedium‐term national fis‐
cal strategy to ensure financial sustainability, the adap‐
tations needed for the Stability and National Reform
Programmes for 2020, and the importance to adopt the
Investment and Reform Plan as soon as possible so as to
be able to take advantage of EU funds.
Both in Ireland and Italy, parliamentary questions
drawing on IFIs’ evidence are predominantly asked by
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Table 1. Citations of IFIs in parliamentary questions.
Irish Dáil Éireann Italian Chamber of Deputies Spanish Congress
Total number of questions (2019–2020) 19,720 16,325 31,178
Number of questions where the evidence 52 8 28
provided by the IFI are cited
members of opposition groups, though not exclusively.
The questions asked by Irish MPs ranged from requests
for clarifications regarding the precise nature of the rela‐
tionship between the Minister of Finance and the IFAC
(whether the latter cooperates with the Minister and
how it can provide guidance; see question 49136/18 by
deputy Michael Moynihan, Fianna Fáil, in 2019) to the
Government’s compliance with the IFAC’s critical review.
For instance, on 26 September 2019, Deputy Thomas
P. Broughan (Independent) asked how the Government
would have responded to the IFAC’s criticism regarding
the lack of credibility of the medium‐term plan for the
2020 budget. The Minister of Finance, Paschal Donohoe,
explained the reasons for the disagreement with the
IFAC, linked to the expenditures’ ceilings, and defended
the executive’s projections of the expenditures’ growth
rate for the period 2020–2024. On 29 September 2020,
Deputy Richard Bruton (Fine Gael) and Deputy Gerald
Nash (Labour Party) asked two similar questions to the
Minister of Finance about the governmental position on
the IFAC’s advice on the future budget, in particular on
the additional stimulus that needs to be added. These
oral questions triggered a well‐informed and respectful
discussion between the Minister and the two Deputies
(one from the majority and one for the opposition) on
the spending priorities to be foreseen in light of the pan‐
demic and of Brexit. In these circumstances, it appears
that the background information and assessment pro‐
vided by the IFAC enhanced the quality of the parliamen‐
tary debate and let MPs discuss the complex economic
and financial developments with greater precision.
In the Italian Chamber of Deputies such a level of
debate, triggered by the IPBO’s observations, has not
characterised the question time in the period considered.
On some occasions, the findings presented in the reports
of the IPBO were used by the MPs to ask oral or written
questions to the Executive, alongside similar data pro‐
vided by other independent authorities or public admin‐
istrations (see, e.g., A.C. oral question no. 3‐00537 tabled
on 19 February 2019 by deputies for the Democratic
Party, then in opposition; and A.C. written question
no. 4‐06635 tabled on 30 August 2020 by deputies of the
5SM). In the few cases where parliamentary questions
did cite the IPBO’s position, the IFI’s assessmentwas used
as the basis to ask the executive for clarifications. For
example, the oral question no. 3‐00920, put forward on
30 July 2019 by deputies from the Five StarMovement to
the thenMinister of Finance, Giovanni Tria, relied on the
projections of the IPBO to look for information about the
governmental measures planned to contain the negative
effects of the passive interest rates on the public debt
for the period 2020–2021. Likewise, on 22 October 2020,
oral question no. 3‐01834, presented by opposition MPs
from Forza Italia quoted the IPBO’s critical assessment
of the forecasts for the period 2022–2023, asking the
Government to clarify how it intended to mitigate the
uncertainty linked to the financing (according to the draft
budgetary plan for 2021) of a significant part of the 2022
and 2023 budgets through fiscal feedback whose final
volume was hard to predict.
4.3. The ‘Comply or Explain’ Procedures
A potential ‘enabler’ of parliamentary accountability
through the use of IFIs’ reports and opinions is the
‘comply or explain’ procedure, also recommended by
the Commission. The procedure is foreseen in the three
countries but with a different level of involvement of
the legislature and is variously applied in practice. In
Italy, the ‘comply or explain’ procedure is triggered by
Parliament: When the IPBO expresses an assessment
that significantly deviates from that of the executive, at
least one‐third of themembers of the committee dealing
with public finance can ask the Government to explain
the reasons why it wishes to confirm its position or,
instead, it can adjust it to the IPBO’s recommendations
(Law no. 243/2012, Article 18, para 3).
In Ireland, if the Government “does not accept an
assessment of the Fiscal Council” in relations to any mat‐
ters under its jurisdiction, theMinister shall “prepare and
lay before Dáil Éireann a statement of the Government’s
reasons for not accepting it” within twomonths of being
given a copy of this evaluation (Irish Parliament, 2012,
Article 8, para 6). In Spain, however, the ‘comply or
explain’ procedure does not foresee the participation
of the Parliament. The AIReF delivers recommendations
to all public administrations, including to the regional
and local authorities. If the targeted administration, for
example, the Government or one of its Ministries, does
not intend to comply, then it needs to publicly explain
its reasons (Ley organica 6/2013, Article 5). The AIReF
publishes a report collecting the recommendations and
all the responses from the public administrations every
quarter. The recommendations are addressed both to
the substance of the measures adopted and, most of all,
to problems of transparency of the administration con‐
cerned (Kasperskaya & Xifré, 2018, pp. 65–69). In par‐
ticular, the majority of them typically deal with difficul‐
ties faced by the AIReF in accessing information and
data requested from the administration, including to the
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Government (OECD, 2018), who in the past had tried
to act as a filter between the administration and the
AIReF (Fromage, 2017, p. 133). The AIReF’s reports of
the last two years show that the situation has substan‐
tially improved. Although some explanations by the exec‐
utive still remain elusive and vague, the Government is
more responsive and committed to following the IFI’s
recommendations. For example, in the AIReF’s report on
the third trimester published on 26 November 2020, of
the five recommendations issued during the previous
months, four of them had been already implemented
by the Government or were in the process of being
implemented. This notwithstanding, the Parliament is
not involved in the procedure: Some of the AIReF’s
recommendations are discussed during the hearings of
the President and, occasionally, the Government is chal‐
lenged on the matter when relevant parliamentary ques‐
tions are asked or during plenary debates, but the ‘com‐
ply or explain’ process occurs outside the Parliament.
The situation is different in Ireland and Italy, where
the starting of a ‘comply or explain’ procedure is not a
frequent event. The IFAC has repeatedly challenged the
reliability of the figures and the forecasts provided by the
Government in the past (European Fiscal Board, 2017,
p. 35). Although the Executive has not always responded
to the IFI’s criticism nor has it always adjusted its propos‐
als to it, in 2016 its negative opinions on the governmen‐
tal projections for deficit and debt, defined as unrealistic
(in the Fiscal Assessment Reports of November 2015 and
2016), triggered an ad hoc debate with the Government
in the Parliament and the subsequent re‐adaptation of
the projections for the budget of 2017. The procedure
has not been formally triggered since then, although the
Government regularly responds to the IFAC’s reports and
on a number of occasions the Executive has de facto
engaged in the Parliament to justify the divergence in its
position with the IFAC: In 2019 and 2020 during the ques‐
tion time, in hearings or parliamentary debates, and in a
few cases it has been also asked byMPs for its responses.
In Italy, the IPBO has very often ‘challenged’ the
overly optimistic forecasts of the Government on which
the budget was modelled compared to the macroe‐
conomic situation. The ‘comply or explain’ procedure
was activated by the budget committees of the Italian
Parliament just once in 2016, as well as on another
occasion, in 2018, when the IPBO explicitly objected to
the governmental fiscal policy. In 2016, it validated the
macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts for 2017 with
a series of critical observations. In the framework of a
parliamentary hearing, the IPBO President explained the
reasons for such a position and, following these concerns,
the Ministry of Finance subsequently revised the fore‐
casts. In 2019 and 2020, there was no lack of critical opin‐
ions from the IPBO, especially during the budget session
for 2020, but the opposition groups did not use the pro‐
cedure under Article 18 of Law no. 243/2012.
To sum up, the ‘comply or explain’ procedure toward
the Government has been regularly used in Spain, where
the Parliament is not directly involved. By contrast, in
Ireland and Italy where parliamentary participation in
the process is guaranteed, it has been seldom activated.
5. Conclusions
The Irish, the Italian, and the Spanish parliaments have
started to make use of reports and opinions produced
by the respective IFIs since their setting up. The latter
have indirectly contributed to reducing the information
asymmetry vis‐à‐vis the governments. Thus, dealingwith
the first research hypothesis, the IFIs’ activity has signifi‐
cantly enhanced the access of the three legislatures (the
lower chambers, in particular, which have been the tar‐
gets of the empirical analysis) to budgetary information,
indirectly improving their scrutiny capacity. However, no
significant advancement can be detected, as a conse‐
quence of the fiscal councils’ operation, in the ability and
willingness of these chambers to pass judgments of the
executive’s fiscal policy and to prompt the government
to justify or correct its conduct. As such, a trend can
be detected in the three systems under review: It does
not appear that there is a clear relationship between
the strength of the budgetary powers of these legisla‐
tures however affected they have been by the reform
of the European economic governance, and the prospec‐
tive benefits fiscal councils have for enhancing parlia‐
mentary accountability.
Moving on to assess the second hypothesis, the insti‐
tutional positioning of IFIs, within or outside the parlia‐
ment, has implications on the overall volume and fre‐
quency of hearings of the IFI’s members in front of
parliamentary committees. This positioning was much
higher with regard to the IPBO than was the case for
the stand‐alone IFAC and the AIReF which was estab‐
lished within the executive. Yet the number of parlia‐
mentary questions citing the evidence provided by the
IPBO to control the government is quite limited, as it
is in the Irish and in the Spanish contexts. In the three
legislatures, the opposition MPs have been keener than
the majority members, especially during the pandemic
year, to use IFIs reports and opinions to hold the govern‐
ment accountable.
The ‘comply or explain’ procedure, despite being
strongly recommended by the Commission, has been
marginally exploited by the legislatures (including by
opposition groups) regardless of the IFI’s institutional
positioning. In Ireland and Italy the ‘comply or explain’
procedure, which in both cases foresees the involve‐
ment of the parliament, was not enforced in 2019–2020
nor did the government promptly adjust itself to the
IFIs’ positions. By contrast, in Spain, the publication by
AIReF of all its recommendations to the Government and
the public administrations as well as their follow‐up has
improved accountability of the Executive even though
the Parliament simply receives the AIReF reports and
does not play a role in the activation of the ‘comply or
explain’ procedure.
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To conclude, the three legislatures have exploited
the activity of the IFIs to better hold the government
into account only to a limited extent, in particular, to
ask for justifications or for the corrections of its fiscal
and budgetary policy. Based on the case studies exam‐
ined, the institutional proximity and the regular con‐
tact of the IFI (however independent and functionally
autonomous) with the parliament do not seem deci‐
sive for the strengthening of parliamentary accountabil‐
ity procedures. Despite the fiscal councils’ similar pow‐
ers, nomajor differences could be detected in this regard
between the influence of the AIReF, the IFI with the loos‐
est direct contact with the legislature, the IPBO, and the
IFAC somewhat placed in between. Nor do the budgetary
powers with which a legislature is equipped appear to
determine the way in which parliaments ‘make use’ of
the fiscal councils.
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